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ATTORNEYS AT LAW. 'By James Reid Parker. New York: Doubleday,
Doran & Company, 1941. Pp. x, 247. $2.00.
THE big double doors directly opposite the bank of elevators on the thirty-
first floor of a Wall Street office building swung violently open. In doing
so they made temporarily unreadable the legend printed in large black letters
across their panes: Carstairs, Correvant, Payne & Moore, although they did
not interfere with the readability of a long list of small-lettered names at
the bottom of the right-hand pane, looking for all the world like the small
type in one of the leases occasionally drawn up by the owner of one of the
bottom names on the list.
"Oh my goodness," said Miss Daisy Devine (a nicc name for the movies,
she often thought) dropping her compact into her lap behind the reception
desk. Then quickly, "Good morning, Mr. Moore."
"G'morn," replied that gentleman without looking and without slackening
his pace.
"Oh my goodness," said Miss Devine. Mr. Moore was usually so nice
spoken. She looked at her watch, held it to her ear, and looked again. Eight
thirty-five. It was a rare day when a senior partner appeared before nine-
fifteen.
She turned to watch Mr. Moore's back as he bulled down the corridor
toward his corner office overlooking the East River. In one band was the
inevitable brief-case. In the other hand was a book. Even from her distance,
Miss Devine could see that it was not a law book.
"Oh my goodness," she said, and lapsed into silence.
Not so Mr. Moore. Without bothering to circumnavigate his desk lie
lunged across it for his phone.
"Yes, Mr. Moore?" smiled Miss Potts at the switchboard.
"Give me Mr. Carstairs."
Miss Potts unsniled, plugged in a wire with a shrug, looked at her watch,
shook it, and said, "I'm sorry, Mr. Moore. Mr. Carstairs isn't in yet. Would
you like me to call him at his - --
"Give me Mr. Payne."
Miss Potts plugged and shrugged again. "I'm sorry, Mr. Moore ---
"Mr. Turner."
Miss Potts repeated. "I'm sorry ---
"Is no one in? Doesn't anybody ever come to work in this office?" Mr.
Moore paused, panting.
"I'm sorry, Mr. Moore, it is a little early."
"Ask Mr. Carstairs, Mr. Payne and Mr. Turner to call me as soon as
they arrive. I don't suppose Mr. Correvant will come in at all but if he
does tell him, too." And Mr. Moore hung up, definitively.
But not before Miss Potts heard him mutter, "Outrage. Prepost ---
She wondered what the New Deal had done now.
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An hour later Mr. Moore's phone rang. Mr. Moore had spent the hour
pretending to read the plaintiff's brief in the case of Dumnphy vs. The Estate
of John Dumphy (Carstairs, Correvant, Payne & ,Moore for the defendant),
smoking eleven cigarettes, and walking back and forth across his office with
occasional stops to glare at a book that lay on his desk. It was not a law
book.
"You want me, Arthur?"
"George? I certainly do. Would you mind stepping over? There's a
very serious matter which I should prefer not to discuss even by inter-office
phone."
Miss' Potts, who had been listening in, said "Stinker" under her breath.
The object of this appellation was standing behind his desk as though
ready to address the Court of Appeals when Mr. Payne pushed open the
door.
"What's up? You sound like an undertaker, even fur you. We losing
another account ?"
"No," said M\r. Moore, addressing the Court of Appeals. "But the sub-
ject of my perturbation is, I assure you, equally distressing, equally out-
rageous, and equally demanding of immediate measures fur the protection
of this firm. Have you seen," and Mr. Moore momentarily lost his oratorical
altitude, "that ?"
Mr. Payne looked where Mr. Moore was pointing. All fie could see was
a rather small book, which looked far too innocuous to deserve the stigma of
Mr. Moore's now quivering finger. The title of the book was 1ittorneys
At Law. Its author appeared to be one James Reid Parker.0
"You been reading again, Arthur?" asked Mr. Payne.
"This," said Mr. Moore, regaining his altitude, "is scarcely an appropriate
occasion for levity. The volume I am indicating happens to be one of the
most audacious and infamous bits of scurrility that it has ever been my
misfortune to read. It purports to be a collection of diverting sketches con-
cerning the members and activities of an imaginary New York law office.
As such, it was presented to me by my nephew, who is now in attendance
at the Yale School of Law, with, I assume, the misguided supposition that
it would afford me amusement. I was not amused."
Mr. Moore paused for effect. The effect was somewhat spoiled by the
ringing of his telephone. Mr. Moore, not to be done out of his peroration,
let it ring.
"That book," and he pointed again, "is nothing other than a contemptible,
thinly disguised and libellous travesty of the affairs of the firm of Carstairs,
Correvant, Payne & Moore."
"Oh," said Mr. Payne, "that's different." He reached for the book.
Mr. Moore reached for the phone.
"Arthur?" came Mr. Carstairs' voice. "'Miss Potts tells me you are an.ious
to confer with me. Don't bother to come over here. I'll be across directly.
Martin is with me. I'll bring him along." Mr. Carstairs then hung up. As
senior senior partner he was in a position to cut off Mr. Moore without
a word, a privilege greatly envied by the younger members of the firm.
1942]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Mr. Payne was leafing through Attorneys At Law and Mr. Moore was
still panting slightly from his forensic efforts when Mr. Carstairs and Mr.
Turner arrived.
"Arthur's got a bug," said Mr. Payne. "Thinks this is about us. Thinks
it makes asses out of us."
"It is not," said Mr. Moore, "a matter of conjecture. It is a matter of
knowledge, which I deeply fear will shortly become, if I may lapse into
legalism, a matter of common knowledge."
"What? That we're asses?" asked Mr. Turner.
"That the book with which George is now soiling his hands was written
as a deliberate effort to ridicule the law firm of Carstairs, Cofrevant,
Payne - - - "
"& Moore," chimed in Mr. Payne.
Mr. Carstairs did not smile. "Tell us about it, Arthur," he said.
Mr. Moore took a deep breath. "The book recounts in a flippant and
cynical manner certain of the personal and business activities of the members
of this law firm, ineptly masked as 'Forbes, Hathaway, Bryan & Devore,'
The Forbes of the book is portrayed as a pompous, humorless reactionary.
He is clearly our Mr. Carstairs."
"I beg your pardon," said Mr. Carstairs.
"The notion that I intended to convey," said Mr. Moore, slightly flus-
tered, "is that the physical characteristics, habits, and general demeanor
of the book's Mr. Forbes make it clear that he is intended as a caricature
of you, Charles. Moreover, Hathaway in the book is indubitably Correvant.
He displays the same casual and uncooperative attitude toward the firm's
financial affairs, the same radical political views, the same preoccupation with
trivia of a non-legal nature, and he is actually, by the most malicious sar-
casm, made the hero, if such one may call him, of the book."
"How about me, Arthur?" asked Mr. Payne.
"You are presented, but as a comparatively minor character." And a
close observer might have caught a slight smirk of satisfaction on Mr.
Moore's indignant face. "Not so Martin here. In fact, the author has the
unbounded temerity to include in a highly insulting portrait that unfortunate
affair involving one of our stenographers in which he was embroiled two
years ago."
Mr. Carstairs scowled at Mr. Turner, whose indiscretion, albeit embar-
rassing, had been forgiven at the time for the simple reason that Mr. Turner's
adeptness with legal language made him a valuable asset to the firm. Mr.
Turner reddened.
Mr. Moore continued, crescendo. "Yet I can state without fear of con-
tradiction that no member of this firm is so unjustly and slanderously pil-
loried - - - "
Again, the phone interrupted one of Mr. Moore's periods. "Yes?" he
barked.
"Mr. Moore?" said Miss Potts. "Mr. Ball of Frasier, Peabody, Allison
& Ball is extremely anxious - - -"
"Tell him I'm in conference. Call later," snapped Mr. Moore, hanging up.
"Frasier, Peabody, Allison & Ball, indeed," he snorted, forgetting his period.
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"I should not be surprised if that finn of - of - client-snatchers actually
put this scoundrel Parker up to writing this book. Perhaps even remuner-
ated him for it."
Frasier, Peabody, Allison & Ball, as may be judged, were highly respected
rivals of Carstairs, Correvant, Payne & Moore, not only in the comparative
camaraderie of the court-room but more significantly in the vital and bitter
business of corralling clients.
"I should doubt it," said Mr. Carstairs. "Proceed with your story."
"As I was about to state when interrupted," said Mr. M more, trying to
recapture his period, "the most malevolent caricature in that venomous volune
is of myself. The intended parody is apparent in divers particulars, perhaps
the most ill-concealed of which is the obviously ostentatious diction of the
character Devore, which is undoubtedly presented as a supposedly humorous
exaggeration of my own meticulous adherence to correct philology."
"What," asked Mr. Carstairs abruptly, "do you intend that we should
do about this, granting that upon inspection of the book in question we should
concur with your conclusions?"
"I deem it appropriate," replied Mr. Moore, drawing himself up, "and
essential to the preservation of the dignity and prestige of this firm that such
of you gentlemen as care to, after a perusal of that book, should join me
in a libel suit against its author and its publishers."
"Pretty hard to prove libel," said Mr. Payne.
"Nonsense. Not in this instance," said Mr. Moore. "The veil of simulated
pseudonymity is far too flimsy. Thus, I am represented in the book as a
Mr. Devore. Devore. Moore. The names are practically identical. As for
the name of the firm --- "
Again the telephone rang. Mr. Moore continued before answering:-
"--- the similarity is striking. Carstairs-Correvant-Pavne-&-Moore.
Forbes-Hathaway-Bryan-&-Devore."
"Frasier, Peabody, Allison & Ball," said Miss Potts over the phone, "is
most anxious to speak to you immediately. I'm sorry, Mr. Moore, to intrude.
They requested that I should. Maay I connect your"
"Ball again," said Mr. Moore to the room.
"Better take it," said Mr. Carstairs. "We'll wait."
"Put him on," said Mr. Moore into the phone. Then, "Yes, Ben - Yes.
- Advice? - Certainly. - A contemplated action? - Of what nature?
- I beg your pardon?"
Even Mr. Carstairs, Ir. Payne, and Mr. Turner could hear M1r. Ball's
words come distinctly through Mr. Moore's earpiece:
"I said it's a little matter of libel."
FRED RODELLt
tProfessor of Law, Yale Law School.
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FREE S'EECH IN THE UNITED STATES. By Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Cam-
bridge: The Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. xii, 634. $4.00.
THERE are many who say: This is an all-out war for democracy. Our
cause is indubitably just. Those who are not wholly on our side aid the
enemy. We cannot risk allowing them freedom of speech. Should we lose
the war, there will be no free speech for any of us. If the forces of democracy
win, we can then restore free speech for all. Any unjust silencing of well-
meaning Americans in the process must simply be reckoned as part of the
price of victory.
Those who find reason and wisdom in this policy should expose their minds
to Free Speech in the United States by Professor Chafee of the Harvard Law
School. I venture to predict that many such minds would be changed.
Chafee is not an ivory tower liberal, nor is his book in any sense a plea
for unlimited free speech. It is, rather, "an inquiry into the proper limita-
tions upon freedom of speech." It is based largely upon commonsense and
practical experience, rather than upon any appeal to inherent rights or fine-
spun legalisms, Chafee concedes without question the necessity, during
wartime or peacetime, of punishing such overt acts as espionage, sabotage,
insurrection, assassination, or other uses of violence. The real problem
concerns words, not overt acts: when should the state punish the utterance
of words which have a tendency to lead to unlawful acts?
Much of our thinking on this problem has been blurred by measuring
the individual interest in self-expression against the social interest in public
safety. Individual self-expression is regarded as a luxurious by-product of
democracy which must yield during crisis to the superior social interest in
public safety. Viewed from this angle, it makes scant difference whether
some persons are punished during wartime for uttering words which might
have only a remote tendency to cause unlawful acts; and it is easy to be
satisfied with merely a restoration of the democratic process after the victory
of democracy.
Chafee approaches the problem differently. His primary concern is with
the effect of suppression upon social progress. To Chafee the lifeblood of
democracy is the freest possible discussion of objectives and methods of
government. Thus, individual self-expression as a means of satisfying the
individual is important only secondarily; primarily, it is important because
it is the method of achieving the social interest in the attainment of truth.
"The real value of freedom of speech is not to the minority that wants to
talk, but to the majority that does not want to listen." To determine whether
speech is lawful or unlawful, it is necessary to balance the two social interests
-public safety and the search for truth. "Every reasonable attempt should
be made to maintain both interests unimpaired, and the great interest in
free speech should be sacrificed only when the interest in public safety is
really imperiled, and not, as most men believe, when it is barely conceivable
that it may be slightly affected." Chafee concludes that the state should
not intervene if words have merely an injurious tendency; it should intervene




Many peacetime adherents of the clear and present danger test argue
that wartime conditions should render unlawful practically any statement
reflecting dissatisfaction with the war. On the contrary, says Chafee, as
long as such statements are not "clearly liable to cause direct and dangerous
interference with the conduct of the war," it would be a great mistake to.
suppress them. Suppression because our morale might be undermined wuuld
betray a singular lack of confidence in our cause. More than that, it might
seriously impair the effectiveness of our war effort by discouraging healthy
criticism and discussion. Issues which have become acute since the appear-
ance of Chafee's book illustrate the vital role of criticism and discussitin
during wartime: e.g., of our diplomacy (should we appease Vichy?), uf
our war generalship (was Pearl Harbor on the alert?), of our industrial
mobilization (has our dollar-a-year men system proved unsatisfactory?),
of our civilian defense preparations (what are their inadequacies?). Even
if we purport to punish only persons hostile to the war, we may thereby
silence persons who say that we are not running the war as effectively as
we might. As Chafee puts it, "the imprisonment of 'half-baked' agitators
for 'foolish talk' may often discourage wise men from publishing valuable
criticism of governmental policies." Furthermore, those who fervently sup-
port the war may overlook important facts which might be brought to light
by opponents of the war. "The truth may be told with a bad purpose, but
it is none the less the truth; and the most dangerous falsehoods may be
committed from motives of the highest patriotism."
Chafee's basic views on free speech during wartime have not changed in
the eventful twenty-one years since his first book appeared. In fact, despite
the author's prefatory statement that the material from the earlier book has
been revised throughout, the revisions in the text have been minor and
few. It is a tribute to Chafee's judgment and insight that what he wrote
in 1920, with the experience of the First World War fresh in mind, needed
only the slightest alterations to make good sense when read in these days
of the Second World War.
It is one thing to formulate the proper limitations of free speech during
wartime. It is quite another thing to get men to abide by such limitations.
What are the prospects during the present war?
John Lord O'Brian, who administered the Espionage Act in the last war,
wrote of prosecutions under that Act: ". . . there has been little difficulty in
securing convictions from juries. On the contrary, it has been necessary at
all times to exercise caution in order to secure to* defendants accused of
disloyalty the safeguard of fair and impartial trials." This is an under-
statement. Unfortunately, as Chafee points out, juries were so carried away
by patriotic fervor that an unpopular defendant seldom had a chance of
acquittal. Ien and women were imprisoned for uttering words which had
only the barest conceivable possibility of interfering with the war effort.
judge Amidon's description of jurymen's behavior is more vivid than
O'Brian's: "For the first six months after June 15, 1917, I tried war cases
before jurymen who were candid, sober, intelligent business men, whom I had
known for thirty years, and who under ordinary circumstances would have
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had the highest respect for my declarations of law, but during that period
they looked back into my eyes with the savagery of wild animals, saying
by their manner, 'Away with this twiddling, let us get at him.' Men believed
during that period that the only verdict in a war case, which could show
loyalty, was a verdict of guilty."
On the basis of experience during the last war, Chafee concluded that
American citizens under the spell of patriotism cannot be relied upon to
judge fairly the guilt or innocence of an unpopular defendant accused of
having uttered seditious words. It is still too early to say definitely whether
the character of our juries will be different during this war. In view of
the virtual unanimity in support of the war, it is perhaps too much to expect
that our juries will be calmer by nature than those of the last war.
The statutory background is more ominous than during the last war.
Under the 1917 Espionage Act, which is again in effect, there were few
convictions for actually urging men to evade the draft or not to enlist. Most
persons were convicted for expressing opinions about the merits or conduct
of the war. The Sedition Act of 1918 has been repealed, but instead we
have the even more expansive Smith Act of 1940 which authorizes severe
penalties for offenses defined in even vaguer terms than those under the
Espionage Act of 1917. Chafee effectively points out how such a statute
might be used to stifle public discussion rather than to prevent military
disaffection. Thus, if juries are given the opportunity to convict, they will
not be hampered by the absence of statutory authority.
Can we look to the courts for assurance against improper limitations on
free speech during the war? The conduct of the judiciary combined with
the exigencies of the legal process left Chafee considerably discouraged at
the end of the last war. -With a few notable exceptions, the district court
judges were largely ineffective as calm restraints upon juries. They often
badgered defendants from the bench. Their charges were often inflammatory.
They rarely set aside verdicts as against the weight of evidence. And they
often outdid the eagerness of the jury by inflicting stunning sentences, of
10, 15 or 20 years, upon the defendants. The Supreme Court was completely
ineffective as a guardian of liberty during the war; the first case under the
Espionage Act did not reach that Court until well after the war was over.
Even in the immediate post war period, the Supreme Court failed to exert
much of a curbing influence. Not until later were the majority genuinely
won over to the clear and present danger test; hence comparatively few
convictions were actually reversed.
During the present war, we may expect the judiciary to exercise more
effective restraints upon overzealous juries than during the last war. Free
speech decisions of the Supreme Court during the past decade have strength-
ened the clear and present danger test, first expressed in the Schnck case
and reiterated in the classic dissents of Brandeis and Holmes. This guidance
from precedents, unavailable in the last war, should help conscientious trial
judges in conducting the trial, charging the jury, setting aside improper
verdicts, and imposing sentences commensurate with the gravity of the of-
fense. Nevertheless, we must be cautious in relying upon the Supreme Court
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to repair the damage wrought by erring juries and judges. Delay in appealing
such cases will very likely still prevent that Court from reversing specific
convictions in time to counteract the inhibiting influence of the original
conviction upon public discussion.
With the laws we have, the juries we may expect, and the limited judicial
influence we may at best hope for, there is still not much doubt that criminal
convictions for expressions hostile to the war would be easy to obtain. The
fate of free speech in wartime is thus placed largely in tile hands of tile
prosecuting and police officers of the Government. Indiscriminate arrests and
irresponsible prosecutions will effectively suppress public discussion no matter
what the eventual outcome of each individual case. We may as well face
the fact that there is no really effective remedy against such practices in
time of crisis except the self-restraint of the officers entrusted with enforce-
ment of the law. In this vital respect, we have reason, so far, to he opti-
mistic. The wartime administration of the Attorney-General's Office has
been based upon a keen awareness of the abuses during the last war. Attorney-
General Biddle has made many efforts to establish an atmosphere of calm-
ness. He has taken the important step of removing United States attornev
from local pressures by requiring all prosecutions to be approved first in Wash-
ington. Wliether this policy of self-restraint will continue to be successful
depends largely on the amount of public support it receives, and the vigi-
lance of informed public opinion in calling immediate attention to abuses.
As Chafee shows at length, wartime censorship beyond military necessity
can muzzle public discussion even more directly, and with even fewer safe-
guards, than arrests and prosecutions. Here, too, there is need of informed
and vigorous public opinion which will expose abuses and support Govern-
ment officials who will keep free, as instruments of discussion, the mails,
the radio, and the press.
It is unfortunate that preoccupation with some of the immediate free speech
problems raised by the war has precluded discussion of other equally inter-
esting aspects of Free Speech in the United States. The book covers a far
wider range of subjects than my discussion has indicated. Many of them
are associated primarily with times of crisis and will be particularly useful
in the coming postwar period, e.g.. wholesale deportations, punishment for
criminal syndicalism, and "purification" of the legislature. Other subjects
are of continuing general interest, e.g., exclusion of communists from the
ballot, freedom of assembly, and censorship of various media of expression.
A few of Chafee's comments (particularly on the Herulon case) are open to
question, and there is cause for disappointment in his omission of certain sub-
jects. The chronological arrangement of the book is often disconcerting, and
the absence of transitions between disconnected subjects often results in a
noticeable jerkiness. Nevertheless, these minor disadvantages cannot detract
from the fact that, for lawyer and layman alike, Chafee's biok is the best
available storehouse of sound and competent information on freedoml of
speech in the United States.
HERBERT A. FIERST -
tMember of the New York Bar.
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FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION. By Randolph E. Paul. Boston:
Little, Brown & Company, 1942. Pp. xx, 1615. Two vols. $20.00.
WHEN a legal author's reputation becomes as well established as was
Mr. Paul's after the universal acceptance of Paul & Mertens' Law of Federal
Income Taxation as the standard work on the subject, the profession
awaits any new work with confidence in its soundness and usefulness. Un-
fortunately, sometimes the second work does not live tip to expectations and
is a mere potboiler, trading on the established reputation. In this case,
however, Mr. Paul's new work more than fulfills the anticipation of the
tax bar and others- interested in the field. In fact, the newest product of
Mr. Paul's scholarship is a far better book than the earlier work, partly
because the field is more limited so that there could be a greater concentration
of effort, and partly because Mr. Paul has greatly improved as a writer in
the eight years that have elapsed since the publication of his first work.
He has worked out the system of gathering and collating the vast amount
of material out of which a work of this scope must be constructed. Mean-
while he has published the series of Studies, and has lectured at Yale and
Harvard, so that he has advanced considerably in smoothness of presentation
of his material. The result is a very workable book, excellently indexed,
and with a wealth of references tb the material to be found in legal periodi-
cals. Strangely enough, this book is the first comprehensive treatment of
the federal estate and gift taxes. With due credit to Montgomery, the
material in his handbooks in this field represents but a fraction of the sub-
stance of Mr. Paul's work. Nevertheless, in the 25 years that have elapsed
since the first modern federal estate tax, there has been a great deal of
writing on the subject in the law reviews; Mr. Paul is completely familiar
with this literature, and makes it available for the bar in the citations in this
book. In addition, the cases are all cited or discussed, the more important
ones with complete statement and analysis.1 Also, there is a considerable
range of social and economic material and general literary allusion, which
are a welcome ornament to a subject which tends to be dryly technical. Most
tax lawyers will admit that taxation has its dull places. General practitioners
find it boring, and to the layman it is hopelessly so. There is comfort for
all these classes of readers in Mr. Paul's book because he has developed an
ability to write interestingly and with verve, which is a real triumph in
a specialized work.
Without doubt this is a book for lawyers, and contains the traditional
material that lawyers use to prepare their cases and advise their clients, but
it is not presented in the traditional way, for Mr. Paul is a realist and not
a slave to words and forms. Furthermore, he has had enough experience
and contact with the academic world and has sufficiently seen government
from the inside to prevent his being too much colored and prejudiced by
the conservatism of the average tax practitioner. Some of those who lean to
the conservative side no doubt think that Mr. Paul approaches the other
extreme. Some idea of the intellectual climate of his views may be obtained
1. Mr. Paul is very thorough, and a check search indicates that there are no
omissions whatsoever of federal cases on the subject at hand.
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from the following quotations. In mentioning the theory that inheritance.
are income, he states that "This striking idea in controversion of the ordinary
notion of income deserves serious reconsideration today." At page 82 he
describes the provisions designed to prevent avoidance by means of inter
vivos gifts as "pitifully inadequate." On page R3 the doctrine of Eisner
v. Macomber is called "an artificial and legally sophisticated concept."
With his usual thoroughness the author has presented an extensive his-
torical review commencing with ancient Egypt. There follow excellent essay-
dealing with the estate tax and the problems of tax avoidance, the com-
munity property system, application of local law, and domicile and situs.
Perhaps too much space is devoted to these subjects. In fact, Mr. Paul
himself has done the basic work more comprehensively on some of those
subjects in earlier studies. Very controversial problems are disposed of some-
what cavalierly, such as the constitutional philosophy displaced by Curry 'u.
McCanless.3 Nevertheless, these treatises on small segments of the law
of taxation are excellent nutshell papers which will prove very useful to
the practitioner, even if he disapproves of the atmosphere pervading them.
which after all consists of the same winds of opinion which blow through
the halls of the Supreme Court itself.
Not only does Mr. Paul analyze the cases and deduce the principles front
them but he also draws aside the curtain of the future and lets us see what
the course of legislation will be and what coming decisions may be expected
to carve out. For instance, tax counselors may take warning from his sug-
gestion that the general gross estate provision may become a catch-all clause
for the estate tax in the same way that Section 22(a) has served that purpose
for the income tax since the Clifford case. So also he proposes a satisfactory
legislative substitute for the conclusive presumption excised from the statute
by Heiner v. Donnan.4
The author has performed needed service in the exposition of the cor-
relation between estate, income and gift tax. He points out the impossibility
of making the law in these three fields a consistent whole when the con-
struction occurs in a piece-meal way. He has well characterized this inter-
relationship as "an almost unbelievable labyrinth", and he has outlined the
interstitial weaving that must occur before we have a whole fabric.
The 100 pages devoted to the chapter on Transfers Taking Effect at
Death is amply justified by the difficulty of the subject matter. The Halloct
case is completely dissected, and its anatomy, physiology and histology are
fully exposed as well as a prognosis made as to the course of the particular
avoidance disease of which the Hallock case was an example. Section 7.19
in this chapter should cause cold chills to run up the backs of trust officers
2. P.7.
3. Pp. 111, 112.
4. This occurs in the chapter on Transfers in Contemplatht4n #of l)eath, %hlicih is a
textbook in miniature on that subject We can only regret that in the purtin dealing
with valuation of such property Mr. Paul feels that the demands of time and space
require brushing off this problem with the comment that "This subject has nanv c m-
plications and needs further development."
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who induce the creation of funded insurance trusts, as it plausibly suggests
imposition of both gift and estate tax and no saving of income tax.5
In his treatment of Powers of Appointment, Mr. Paul is to be commended
for his frankness in criticizing the policy involved and Congressional apathy
"in the hope that corrective legislation may not be too long delayed." In
this chapter, Mr. Paul does not fail to comment on Congressional failure
to provide for apportionment in the donee's estate of a tax due to the power
and the corresponding failure to provide for collection from the appointee.
This is a problem annoying to practitioners and of vital, sometimes disastrous,
import to residuary legatees. In view of Section 826(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code, making such provision in case of insurance, the omission
with respect to powers and transfers made during life is doubly discrim-
inatory. Legislative relief is in orderJ Even more strongly than in the case
of powers does the author feel that insurance is the darling of an indulgent
Congress, and that the statute offers one of the last havens for tax avoiders.
Evidence of this feeling is the characterization of problems of ownership of
policies as "these Augean stables."
Three mechanical elements deserve mention. There is a little too much
detailed quotation from the regulations. An excellent innovation is the classi-
fication of each citation as income tax, estate tax, gift tax or non-tax. On
the other hand, the footnotes are too numerous. They fairly come out as
a rash, dozens to a paragraph. This, of course, is a minor irritation, and
perhaps is inevitable in legal writing, but it does mar the continuity of
Mr. Paul's fine writing.
Now that Mr. Paul has taken an important position with the Treasury,
it will be interesting to see whether some of his ideas of necessary change
become embodied in legislation. Certainly, his colleagues and tax lawyers
generally will need this work at their elbows.
EDWARD S. REID, JR.t
THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Edward Hallett Carr. London: Mae-
millan & Co., 1940. Pp. xv, 312. $3.00.
THIS valuable work is primarily a study of the fundamentals of inter-
national relations, illustrated by the events of history and especially by the
events of the two decades before 1939. It was written before the outbreak
of the war in 1939, but loses nothing by that fact. The author has studied
man in his group relations, and has discovered certain truths which deserve
the closest consideration from students of law and international relations.
Contrary to the efforts of so many hopeful and wishful thinkers, the author




tMember of the Michigan Bar.
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shows that the ethics, morals and ambitions and therefore the law and politics
of groups cannot be measured by the same yardstick as those of individuals,
and that the larger the group, especially the nation-state, the wider the
gap. He examines some of the major aphorisms, such as the harmony of
interests, and shows that they cannot work out in the competing relations
of the nation-states. Whereas the nation-state is the largest unit for internal
peace yet created, it is at all times, given the facts of state life, a menace
to external peace. The harm and good done by the institution of nationalism
are discussed, especially in its application to the treaties of 1919, which
carved up Europe without much concern for economic necessities. Tile
author examines the contributions to thought and action made by the Uto-
pians since 1919 and finds them less than constructive. He understands the
realists also and concludes that they at least have their feet on the ground.
Few among them lack ideals; they are indeed the practical idealists, well
aware of the obstacles to a more ordered world. The relations between
law and morality, on the one hand, and politics -always a manifestation
of power - on the other, are convincingly exposed. The "sanctity of treaties"
is analyzed and shown to be a misleading half-truth; it all depends on the
character of the treaty. Law and change receive major attention.
Professor Carr realizes the limitations of arbitration and adjudication in
settling international disputes, which rarely arise out of legal differences
in any event. Indeed, insistence on legal rights have caused some of the
greatest conflagrations. What is needed, therefore, is not rigidity, which
invites explosions, but flexibility to take account of the unrelenting demand
for change. The unworkability of Article 19 of the Covenant receives
special mention. How to make changes peacefully and without violence is
the one great problem confronting the world, and the author wisely attributes
little weight to the mechanisms devised at Geneva, which were not designed
for serious change. His failure to discuss the Kellogg Pact may indicate,
again correctly, his view of its utility. He shows that sanctions are an in-
strumentality of war.
The author is none too sanguine of the coming of peaceful change. But
by analyzing the types of conflict without legal standards which cause the
most trouble, analogous internally to those between capital and labor, the
author has cleared the ground of confusing miasma and has disclosed the
social focus of the infection long afflicting the world. The job is done with
detachment, an easy scholarship, wit and penetration. Here is a practical
sociologist. No student of the subject, and especially no statesman, should
fail to read this book.
EDwIN BORCLAMDt
tProfessor of Law, Yale Law Schuol.
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TIlE CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATED. By John A. Rush. Los Angeles: Pub-
lished by the Author, 1941. Pp. 423. $4.00.
No book is necessary to demonstrate that a given community will be
governed more efficiently as a single political subdivision of the state thani
as a double entity with one part superimposed upon the other. What is
necessary is a book to show us how we can obtain this sinfgle government
for our cities in place of the double one that the past has bequeathed us.
That is what Mr. Rush tries to show us in his book. I am afraid that
it is a labor of love so far as any large reading public is concerned. The
demand for experts on the subject is hardly greater than the demand for
experts on the Chicago Drainage Canal as a factor in lowering the waters
of the Great Lakes. Such experts exist and are of great service but there
is hardly room enough - even at the top - to attract many aspiring students.
We should be all the more grateful, however, that the book exists. The
statesman who crusades in the rarified atmosphere of the struggle to elim-
inate the duality of city government can find here something that in common
reason he ought not to be entitled to hope for. He can go right into battle
armed with this book instead of spending months collecting the necessary
precedents and the experience of others on which to base his campaign. If
he waits history to support him, it is here, going back to Stdmeria and pro-
gressinj through Greece, Rome, Middle-Age Europe, England and America,
and all seen through the eyes of an advocate for the city as the greatest
single contributing factor in political civilization. If the crusader for the city
wants the law on the classic struggle between legislative domination and
home rule, there are chapters tracing its development. Perhaps the most
valuable part of the book is a series of chapters on the prominent instances
of more or less complete elimination of the double county and city functions
in the state of Virginia and the cities of New York, New Orleans, Baltimore,
Philadelphia, San Francisco, St. Louis, Denver and Honolulu. One about
to undertake a campaign for the purging of useless duplicate offices from
metropolitan territory can in the 150 pages of these chapters find all of the
pitfalls he ought to avoid, all of the positions that he can most easily defend
and most of the tactics that the forces of unrighteousness will use against
him. The book proper doses with a short summary and then follow appen-
dices, one including excerpts at large from state constitutions, but the most
prominent being the first, modestly entitled, The Theft Of A State. This
section details the author's efforts, at first frustrated but finally crowned
with success, to establish constitutionally and judicially "the City and County
of Denver."
Evidently the author had such a good time putting the City and County
of Denver on the map that he could not forego the pleasure of re-living the
joyous conflict in a book. Its pages have a satisfying partisan flavor.
The reader wonders as he progresses through the book whether all of the
courts whose decisions displease Mr. Rush were "composed of judges with
reactionary tendencies" or of judges who were "under the control of poli-
ticians intent on manhandling the cities." Probably not, if the evidence is
no stronger than that Mr. Rush offers in support of his criticism of Judge
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(later Chief judge) Hiscock of New York and his three colleagues for
their prevailing opinion in Admiral Really Company v. City of a Yorl:1
concerning which Mr. Rush comments: "Every one knows, and even judges
should know, that in 1912 courts lent a very attentive ear to the seductive
pleas of the public utility corporations that their grip on the street-car
business should not be interfered with, and decisions rendered under that
subversive influence should not be countenanced."
The author's strictures on the courts probably do no more than reflect
the distrust of the status quo that is part of the reformer's stock in trade.
That is probably the case where he criticizes the decision in Matter of
Phillips,2 which invalidated the petition for a referendum on the abulition
of the multiple sheriffs and registers of New York City. It is characterized
as "one of those 4 to 3 decisions, which generally indicates politics." All
that happened in the case was that three Democratic judges and one Repub-
lican out-voted two Republicans and one Democrat in holding that there
must be evidence in the petition of the qualification of the "qualified voters"
who were the only ones entitled to sign it.3
The author is hardly to be blamed, however, for his jaundiced view of
the courts, or for blandly entitling a chapter Political and Judicial Jugglery,
in the light of his weighted experience with the Denver reform. The story
of his shouting the contents of a District Court's writ of mandate through
a keyhole to the State Board of Canvassers and of his resistance to pro-
ceedings to punish him for contempt of an order of the Supreme Court
forbidding any other court to take jurisdiction is the kind of reading which
warms the cockles of the heart of the journeyman-litigating lawyer.
Cloaked and disfigured here and there by the modem commonplace smoke
screen of "corporation controlled courts" and "shaneless" and "brazen" in-
terference by the great railroad and public utility corporations with the
deliberations of the legislature, the grand old devotion of the common lawyer
to his client shines through the book. The city is Mr. Rush's client and
she is well represented. The common law presumes that if each of the
adverse parties has a lawyer who will make the best case that he can for
his client justice will triumph. So long as the city has a John A. Rush
for her lawyer, she will not lack for justice under this common law system.
He defends her against all comers. He characterizes the doctrine of legis-
lative control of cities- Which is popularly supposed to have been sanc-
tioned by the United States Supreme Court in Trenton v. New Jersey4 -
as "the trumped-up doctrine that the state may create and destroy munici-
palities at will and under that spurious cloak may steal away their liberties."
He is not content to prove that local self-government is desirable. He must
attempt to demonstrate that it is an inherent right dependent upon no
1. 206 N. Y. 110, 99 N. E. 241 (1912).
2. 284 N. Y. 152, 29 N. E. (2d) 969 (1940).
3. Incidentally, the Court of Appeals the next year, by another split decision with
the Democrats in the majority, sustained a later referendum which abolished the sheriffs
and registers. Burke v. Kern, 287 N. Y. 203 (1941).
4. 262 U. S. 182 (1923).
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express constitutional grant for its existence. Just as the supporters of the
inherent rights of the courts to prescribe their own procedure have to recog-
nize the power of the legislature to establish the courts, so Mr. Rush, a
supporter of the right of cities to govern themselves, has to recognize the
power of the legislature to establish the cities, although he trustfully cites
the words on page 84 of 43 Corpus Juris: "the creation of a municipality
with the consent of the inhabitants is in keeping with the Anglo-Saxon spirit
and American institutions, especially the principle of home rule in self-
government."
The book's arguments in favor of local self-government and its formulae
for obtaining it lose nothing, however, because of the author's conviction
that home rule was ordained from Sinai. Nor does the book lose its value
because it is a partisan brief for the city against the state. In the forensic
conflict which always rages when an attempt is made to abolish the county
offices, the arguments for state control through county offices will always
be presented .with the same extreme advocacy. An advocate equipped with
Rush on the City-County Consolidated has all that he needs to enable him
to go just as far on the other side.
EDWARD J. DImocKt
1Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School; Member of the New York Bar.
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